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The Designated Suppliers Program – Revised1 
 
 
Program Overview  
 
The Designated Suppliers Program is a system for protecting the rights of the workers who sew 
university logo apparel.  
 
Under the Designated Suppliers Program, university licensees are required to source most 
university logo apparel from supplier factories that have been determined by universities, through 
independent verification, to be in compliance with their obligation to respect the rights of their 
employees – including the right to organize and bargain collectively and the right to be paid a 
living wage. In order to make it possible for factories to achieve and maintain compliance, 
licensees are required to meet several obligations to their suppliers. Licensees are required to pay a 
price to suppliers commensurate with the actual cost of producing under applicable labor standards, 
including payment of a living wage; they are required to maintain long-term relationships with 
suppliers; and they are required to ensure that each supplier factory participating in the program 
receives sufficient orders so that the majority of the factory’s production is for the collegiate 
market. Licensees may bring any factory they choose into the program, provided the factory can 
demonstrate compliance with the program’s labor standards. The program is phased in over a three 
year period.  
 
 
Scope of Application 
 
The DSP applies to the university logo apparel production of licensee companies (small licensees 
with collegiate apparel sales below a certain threshold are exempt2). 
 
The DSP applies only to apparel and textile products (e.g. clothing, headgear, backpacks, towels, 
etc.); the program does not apply to any other university licensed product.  
 
The DSP applies only to those production facilities where products are sewn and/or assembled. If 
embroidery and/or other embellishments are performed in the facility where the apparel item is 
sewn or assembled, then those processes are also covered by the DSP; otherwise, they are not. 
 
 
Implementation Schedule  
 
The DSP will be implemented in phases. After an initial grace period, the sourcing requirement 
will begin at 25% of each licensee’s collegiate production and will increase annually until phase-in 
is complete, according to the following schedule: 
 
· Grace Period (6 months): No sourcing requirement  
· 1st Program Year: 25% of each licensee’s collegiate apparel must be sourced from DSP 
factories 
                                                 
1 This document delineates the Designated Suppliers Program; it explains the program’s labor standards, 
enforcement mechanisms, and administrative and dispute resolution procedures. The document reflects 
modifications to the program made by the Designated Suppliers Program Working Group in September 2006.  
2 The specific threshold is to be determined. 
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· 2nd Program Year: 50% of each licensee’s collegiate apparel must be sourced from DSP 
factories 
· 3rd Program Year (and subsequent years): 75% of each licensee’s collegiate apparel must 
be sourced from DSP factories 
 
The purpose of the grace period, and of the graduated phase-in of the program, is to ensure that 
licensees can comply with the sourcing requirement without violating any existing contractual 
obligations and, in general, to make the transition to the DSP less burdensome for all parties. The 
graduated phase-in also allows universities to evaluate the DSP, based on real-world experience, 
before it is fully implemented and to make any adjustments in the program that are necessary. 
 
 
Workplace Standards and Factory Obligations  
 
In order to qualify as a designated supplier, a factory must meet the following criteria: 
 
· The factory must demonstrate compliance with internationally recognized labor standards 
as embodied in university codes of conduct. 
 
· The factory must demonstrate that it pays employees a living wage. 
 
· The factory must demonstrate respect for workers’ associational rights. This may be 
demonstrated by the presence in the factory of a representative labor union (or other 
representative employee body3) or, in the absence of such representation, the factory will 
be determined to be in compliance if it has taken the steps necessary to ensure that workers 
can make a free choice about unionization, without fear of reprisal. 
 
In addition, factories may not subcontract collegiate production to non-DSP factories and may not 
use contract labor as a means to circumvent the program’s worker rights standards. 
 
 
Licensee Obligations  
 
Licensees covered by the DSP have the following obligations: 
 
· Sourcing requirement: Each licensee is required to source a set percentage of university 
logo goods from designated supplier factories (see the section on the DSP implementation 
schedule on pages 1-2 for the specific sourcing requirement for each year of the program).4  
 
· Fair price s tandard: Licensees are required to pay each DSP factory a price for its 
products sufficient to enable the factory to produce under the applicable labor standards 
(including the factory’s obligation to pay a living wage and, where a union or worker 
representative body is present, to bargain collectively). 
                                                 
3 For purposes of measuring compliance with the freedom of association standard, a “representative 
employee body” must be an organization that was established without management interference, that 
democratically elects its leaders, and that is able to carry out the essential functions of a union, including 
collective bargaining.  
4 It should be noted that the sourcing requirement applies only to products bearing the names and logos of 
universities that have adopted the DSP. The percentage is measured in terms of the dollar value of the 
licensee’s applicable production, at factory price. 
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· Majority collegiate production requirement: Licensees are required to place enough 
business in each of their DSP factories so that more than 50% of the factory’s total output 
in a given year is for the collegiate market. If a DSP factory is used by more than one 
licensee, the combined total of the licensees’ orders must exceed this 50% threshold. 5  
 
· Long-term production agreements: Licensees are required to enter into a long-term 
production agreement with each of their DSP supplier factories. The contract must be no 
less than three years in length and must commit the licensee to a minimum volume of 
orders each year (either by itself or in combination with other licensees using the facility) 
so that the majority collegiate production requirement is met. Licensees have the right to 
place escape or “out” clauses in these contracts, which protect licensees by allowing them 
to terminate the contract before its expiration in the event that the factory fails to meet 
labor or production standards (despite good faith efforts by the licensee to help the factory 
achieve compliance).6 
 
These long-term contracts, which are essential to ensure a reasonable degree of economic 
security for factories and job security for workers, are not intended to substitute for 
individual contracts for specific orders of apparel. They need not contain any volume or 
production deadlines specific to any individual order, or any specific prices. The contracts 
must simply commit the licensee to A) provide a minimum volume of business over the 
contract term, and B) negotiate a fair price for each order that is ultimately placed. 
 
 
Enforcement Mechanisms  
 
The obligations of licensees and DSP factories are enforced either through independent verification 
by the Worker Rights Consortium or through arbitration between licensees and factories. 
 
Factory compliance with the labor standards is verified through compliance assessments 
conducted by the WRC. Compliance assessments are conducted 1) at the time of a factory’s 
initial application for DSP status, and 2) on an ongoing basis, in response to worker complaints and 
in the form of spot inspections. In the case of findings of non-compliance, the factory is given an 
opportunity to correct the violations identified. Failure to correct the violations results in the loss of 
DSP status (or denial of DSP status if the non-compliance is discovered in the context of a 
factory’s initial application). WRC compliance decisions may be appealed (see page 5). 
 
Licensee compliance with the fair price standard is enforced through binding arbitration 
between the licensee and the factory. The price standard is incorporated into the long-term 
production agreement between the parties. When a dispute arises (because the factory and licensee 
cannot agree on whether the price for a particular order is sufficient to enable the factory to meet its 
labor rights obligations), either party may trigger arbitration, which is conducted by an arbitrator 
chosen by both parties and whose decisions are binding. Failure by a licensee or factory to comply 
with an arbitrator’s decision is considered a serious code violation and is reported to universities 
and the public .  
 
                                                 
5 Orders from a non-collegiate buyer that is willing to abide by the DSP’s labor and fair price standards will 
be counted as collegiate production for the purpose of measuring compliance with this standard. 
6 For additional information concerning long-term production agreements, see page 9. 
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Licensee compliance with the sourcing requirement is enforced by the WRC at the end of each 
program year. Data is supplied by each licensee, enumerating that year’s collegiate production at 
each of its supplier factories (including both DSP and non-DSP factories). The WRC reviews each 
licensee’s data and calculates the percentage of the licensee’s total production that was sourced 
from the DSP facilities. On this basis, the WRC determines whether the licensee has met the 
percentage sourcing requirement applicable to that program year (i.e. 25%, 50% or 75%).7 Failure 
by the licensee to fulfill the sourcing requirement is considered a serious code violation and is 
reported to universities and the public. 
 
Licensee compliance with the majority production requirement is enforced by the WRC at the 
end of each program year. Data is supplied by each factory covering all of its production for the 
year in question and this data is assessed to determine whether a majority of this production was for 
the collegiate market, as required. If a majority of a factory’s production was not for the collegiate 
market in a given year, orders placed by licensees at that factory, in that year, will not be counted 
as DSP orders for the purpose of measuring the licensees’ compliance with the sourcing 
requirement. 
 
Sanctions for non-compliance: For a factory, non-compliance with the labor standards results in 
the loss of DSP status. For a licensee, non-compliance with any of its obligations is reported by the 
WRC to universities and the public . Each university then determines the appropriate sanction under 
the terms of that university’s licensing contract with the licensee. The WRC may recommend a 
particular sanction, but does not itself have the power to sanction licensees. 
 
 
Transparency Requirements  
 
Fair and effective enforcement of the DSP requires transparency on the part of both licensees and 
factories. The transparency obligations of the respective parties are as follows: 
 
Suppliers: University enforcement agents must be granted access to each DSP factory – to factory 
grounds and buildings; to managers, supervisors and workers for the purpose of interviews; and to 
such documents and records as are needed to assess labor rights compliance (the confidentiality of 
proprietary information is respected). The enforcement agent will accommodate the factory’s 
production schedule, but the factory must not otherwise restrict this access. The factory must also 
disclose, on an annual basis, and more frequently if so requested, the production data necessary to 
determine whether the factory is producing a majority of its goods for the collegiate market. 
 
Licensees: Licensees must disclose the production volume data necessary to assess compliance 
with the sourcing requirement, including the annual volume of production at every sewing and 
assembly facility used to produce collegiate goods.  
                                                 
7 A production order placed by a licensee at a DSP factory is not counted toward that licensee’s fulfillment of 
the sourcing requirement if any of the following circumstances arise: 1) the factory does not achieve DSP 
status within 90 days after production begins on the order. 2) The factory has DSP status when the order is 
placed, but loses its status due to labor rights violations before the order is completed and shipped. 3) It is 
determined at the end of the program year that the factory did not produce a majority of its goods for the 
collegiate market, in which case no orders produced at the factory during that program year are counted. In 
the case of the majority collegiate production requirement, exemptions may be granted in situations where a 
licensee can demonstrate that the factory fell below the majority production requirement as a result of 




In addition, in the context of an arbitration, both parties are required to provide any data requested 
by the arbitrator.  
 
Information disclosed in the arbitration process as well as proprietary financial information 
disclosed by a factory or a licensee in the context of a labor rights assessment will be held in 
confidence.  
 
Public Reporting: Reports of all factory assessments conducted by the WRC are public and will 
include a detailed review of the evidentiary basis of all findings (except where such disclosure 
would compromise the confidentiality of individual worker interviews). WRC findings with respect 
to licensee compliance with the souring and majority production requirements are also publicly 
reported (proprietary financial information is not disclosed). The WRC will maintain a public list 
of all DSP factories and the licensees that have contracts with each factory. 
 
 
Appeals Process for Compliance Disputes 
 
If a licensee and/or factory believes the WRC has incorrectly found a factory to be in violation of 
DSP labor standards, the licensee (on behalf of the factory) may file an appeal with the DSP 
appeals panel. The appeals panel will consider all complaints and conduct a full review of those it 
determines, based on initial consideration by one or more members of the panel, to be substantially 
grounded in credible evidence.  
 
After accepting an appeal, the panel examines the WRC’s report, any additional documentary 
evidence supplied by the WRC, and all documentary evidence supplied by the licensee. 
Representatives of the licensee and the WRC appear together before the panel to present arguments 
and each party may pose questions to the other. Based on the documentary evidence and the 
presentations of the two parties, the panel makes a determination as to whether the WRC findings 
were or were not accurate. (The review process is not a repeat of the compliance assessment 
process itself and the appeals panel does not carry out its own investigation of the factory.) If the 
panel determines the WRC findings to have been inaccurate, the factory is deemed to be in 
compliance with DSP standards. Any subsequent WRC assessments of the facility in question are 
automatically reviewed by the appeals panel for a period of two years. 
 
The appeals panel is comprised of individuals with demonstrated expertise in worker rights, 
international labor law, and relevant investigative procedures. The panel members are chosen 
through a multi-stakeholder process in which all parties involved in the DSP and collegiate apparel 
production (factory owners, licensees, unions, NGOs, universities and their enforcement agents) 
play a role . Panel members must be free of all financial conflicts of interest (e.g. they may not be 
employed by apparel corporations or unions involved in the apparel industry).  
 
Appeals are limited to those based on evidence of 1) factual error by the WRC, including omission 
of relevant evidence, misinterpretation of factory records or other documentary evidence, 
misinterpretation of applicable labor law, etc., or 2) failure by the WRC to abide by the DSP’s rules 







Factory Selection Process 
 
The identification and qualification of designated supplier factories will proceed as follows: 
 
Licensee Selection of Candidate Factories: Licensees will select candidate designated supplier 
factories – these are factories that licensees are confident can meet the program’s labor standards 
and at which they intend to place orders. Any stakeholder (universities, unions, NGOs, factory 
owners, etc.) may recommend a facility to licensees as a potential candidate factory, but licensees 
decide which factories, from their own supply chains and/or from recommendations made by other 
parties, they wish to bring into the program. Upon selection of a candidate factory, the licensee 
must provide public notice that the factory has been selected.  
 
Consultation and Remediation: Once a candidate factory has been selected, the licensee is 
responsible for working with that factory to address any outstanding compliance issues. The WRC 
also consults with the management of each candidate factory to ensure that managers fully 
understand their obligations under the program. When requested by the factory and licensee, the 
WRC will assist with the development and execution of a remediation program. The WRC will 
advise licensees of any concerns about a candidate factory’s commitment to, or ability to abide by, 
the program’s labor standards; however, the licensee makes its own determination in each case as 
to whether to proceed and seek designated supplier status for the facility. 
 
Compliance Assessment and Designation: Beginning 908 days after announcing the selection of a 
candidate factory, a licensee may request that the factory be considered for DSP status and that a 
full compliance assessment be conducted by the WRC. Prior to this request being made, the factory 
must have in place a long-term production agreement with one or more licensees sufficient to 
ensure that a majority of the factory’s productive capacity will be devoted to collegiate apparel. 
The WRC will complete the assessment within 60 days after the request is submitted. If the factory 
is determined to be in compliance with the labor standards, designated supplier status is granted. If 
areas of non-compliance are identified, the WRC recommends remedial action and grants the 
factory a reasonable period of time to complete remediation (the amount of time allowed is at the 
discretion of the WRC and depends on the nature of the outstanding compliance issues). The 
factory is then re-assessed and DSP status is granted or denied. If DSP status is denied, the factory 
is not eligible to reapply for DSP status for a period of one year. 
 
Timing of Factory Selection: The timing of factory selection is up to each licensee. A licensee 
may select a new candidate factory at any time, provided that the licensee is ready to commit to 
placing enough business at that factory so that the majority collegiate production requirement will 
be met.  
 
Factories Where University Codes Have Helped Workers Achieve Major Labor Rights 
Improvements: There have been a small number of factories that have achieved and maintained 
substantial labor rights improvements due in significant part to intervention under university codes 
of conduct, undertaken in response to worker complaints. Because of the long-standing relationship 
of many universities with these facilities, and because of the principle that demonstrated 
compliance should be rewarded, it is important to ensure that these factories are supported as 
universities transition to the DSP. For this reason, in the first year of the DSP, any licensee that 
used one of these factories for collegiate production at any time between June 30, 2001 and July 1, 
2006 is required to contract with that factory as one of its DSP facilities, provided the factory 
                                                 
8 The specific time periods referenced in this section are not final and may be adjusted by the Designated 
Suppliers Program Working Group prior to implementation of the DSP. 
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wishes to participate in the DSP and is able to meet the labor standards. Licensees with small 
supply chains are exempt from this requirement, in order to ensure that the requirement does not 
unreasonably restrict licensees’ sourcing options. Only licensees that have twenty or more 
collegiate production facilities as of July 1, 2006 are subject to this requirement. The list of 
factories to which this provision applies, as determined by the WRC, is as follows: 
 
· BJ&B (Dominican Republic) 
· Lian Thai (Thailand) 
· Mexmode (Mexico) 
· PT Dada (Indonesia) 
· PT Kolon Langgeng (Indonesia) 
 
 
Determination of the Living Wage Standard and Appeals Procedure  
 
Under the DSP, factories are obligated to pay a living wage for full-time work – exclusive of 
overtime, non-cash benefits, and any bonuses that do not automatically accrue to workers. The 
specific living wage level for a given country or region is determined by local experts, identified by 
the WRC. These experts construct a culturally appropriate market basket of goods and services, for 
each country or region, sufficient to support a family of average size, and then determine the price 
for each of these goods and services in local markets.9 At the time of program implementation, an 
initial set of baseline studies will be conducted, in order to guide factories and unions. After this, 
additional living wage analyses – specific to a particular factory, location and time – will be 
conducted, as needed, to address worker complaints that a factory has violated the standard.  
 
If a licensee, a factory or a union believes that the wage standard determined through this process is 
factually wrong, an appeal may be filed with an expert panel. The panel functions in the same 
manner as the appeals panel for labor rights compliance issues (see page 5) and is established 
through a multi-stakeholder process. In order to be considered valid by the panel, an appeal must 
be based on concrete evidence that the local experts erred in one or more respects in defining the 
components of the market basket and/or in determining the proper local market price for a 
particular good or service. Decisions of the panel are final and binding on all parties. 
 
The living wage is the minimum wage that DSP factories are required to pay. Payment of the living 
wage does not absolve factories of the obligation to bargain in good faith over wages and other 
issues with any duly constituted union or other representative employee body. The purpose of the 
living wage standard is to ensure decent wages for workers and to prevent DSP factories from 
being undercut competitively by factories paying unfairly low wages. It is not intended to substitute 





Universities will evaluate the impact of the DSP as it is implemented; the most fruitful period for 
review will be at the end of the first program year, when it will be possible to assess, at least to 
some degree, every major issue of interest: impact on workers and labor rights in DSP factories; the 
efficiency, fairness and efficacy of the program’s administrative and enforcement procedures; the 
                                                 
9 Sample living wage calculations, and a more detailed explication of the methodology involved, are 
available at: http://www.workersrights.org/LivingWageEstimates.pdf 
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initial impact of the program on licensee-retailer relationships, retail sales, and licensing revenue; 
etc. Evaluation will continue, with emphasis on the end of each program year. After full 
implementation, one of the major issues universities will address is the desirability of increasing 




Further Explanation of Key Standards and Procedures 
 
Freedom of Association  
 
The DSP’s freedom of association standard is based on the standard developed by the Joint 
Initiative on Corporate Accountability (JO-IN) – a joint project involving the Fair Labor 
Association, Social Accountability International and the WRC, among other groups – with the 
assistance of the International Textile, Leather and Garment Workers Federation and the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The JO-IN standard is stronger than those in 
most other codes of conduct in that it requires factories to adopt a positive attitude toward 
unionization and addresses issues of factory access for union representatives. As elaborated in the 
DSP, the standard requires factories to take concrete steps to ensure that the environment within the 
factory is conducive to genuine freedom of choice, including steps to undo any existing damage – 
whether resulting from past actions by the factory or perceptions on the part of workforce based on 
the broader experience of workers in that country or region. 
 
Under this standard, a factory’s participation in the DSP requires demonstrable respect for the right 
to organize and bargain collectively, as evidenced by the presence of a legitimate trade union (or 
other representative employee body) and/or proactive steps by management necessary to ensure 
that workers can freely exercise these rights without fear of retaliation. These steps shall include: 
 
1. Communicating to the workforce the factory’s openness to workers’ exercise of 
their associational rights, its commitment to refrain from any punitive action 
against workers for the exercise of their right to unionize and bargain, and its 
commitment to recognize and commence good faith negotiations with any duly 
constituted worker body, without unreasonable delay. 
2. Granting free access to the worksite for union representatives to carry out their 
organizing and representational functions, without unreasonable restriction and in 
the context of a formal neutrality or recognition agreement where a union so 
requests. 
3. Ensuring that there is no effort by management and/or supervisory employees, 
through word or action, coercive or otherwise, to influence any worker’s decision 
about unionization or participation in union activities (with the exception of 
communicating the factory’s openness to unionization and its commitment to 
abiding by the standards outlined herein). 
4. Fulfilling – as soon as any legit imate, representative union or worker body is duly 
constituted – management’s commitment to grant recognition and to bargain in 
good faith. 
5. Permitting access to the factory to labor rights experts and representatives of 
NGOs and trade unions to conduct a program of worker rights education, overseen 
by the WRC.  
 
 9 
These activities must be carried out in a manner consistent with compliance benchmarks, which 




Long-Term Production Agreements 
 
In addition to the fair price standard and the commitment by the licensee to provide a minimum 
volume of orders, the long-term production agreements between licensees and designated supplier 
factories include the following: 
 
1) Escape clauses, to protect the licensee in the event that the factory fails to fulfill its 
obligations, with respect to product quality, delivery schedules and related production 
matters; in the event that the factory loses its DSP status; or in the event that the licensee 
suffers a reversal of fortune so severe as to preclude its fulfillment of its commitment to 
place orders (for example, the licensee’s loss of its university licenses or the collapse of 
demand for the product made by the factory). The escape clauses are intended to ensure 
fairness to the licensee, but they may not be used as a pretext for severing a contract.  
2) An arbitration clause that commits both parties to binding arbitration, by an arbitrator 
chosen by the two parties, in the event that they cannot resolve a dispute over the price 
standard or one of the above mentioned escape clauses. 
3) A non-renewal clause, requiring the licensee, if it decides not to renew the agreement at the 
time of expiration, to offer the factory a one-time, one-year extension of the contract, under 
the same terms, but at a reduced volume of production (no less than half of the annual 
volume called for in the original contract). The purpose of this clause is to ensure that 
factories that lose their DSP business can effect an orderly transition back to the non-




The Arbitration Process 
 
Arbitration may be triggered, in the case of a dispute over the fair price standard or one of the 
escape clauses in a production agreement, by either party. The arbitration process, once triggered, 
proceeds as follows: 
 
· The two sides meet, without delay, and choose a neutral arbitrator, who may be any 
individual with the requisite knowledge and capacity for objectivity (to assist with the 
selection process, a list of recommended arbitrators will be developed by the WRC through 
consultation with all relevant stakeholders). The arbitrator chosen must also be willing to 
conduct the arbitration in a timely fashion, initiating the arbitration in no more than ten 
days and resolving it within ten days after initiation. 
 
· The arbitration is paid for by the two parties, with the licensee covering the majority of the 
cost. 
 
· The two parties are required to provide the arbitrator with any documentation or other 
information requested and otherwise to participate in the process with dispatch and in good 
faith. The information provided will be kept confidential. 
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· The arbitrator, based on his or her expertise and good judgment, interprets the fair price 
standard (and/or the relevant out clause) in the context of the particular dispute under 
consideration. The arbitrator may at his or her discretion consult with the WRC on the 
question of the intent of the price standard. 
 
· The WRC has the right to observe the arbitration process. The WRC may provide input to 
the arbitrator concerning its views and analysis of the dispute. The arbitrator may consider 
the WRC’s input at his or her discretion. 
 
· Based on all of the information and input the arbitrator chooses to consider, he or she 
reaches a determination and issues an order to the parties (which may, for example, state 
the price that will be paid by the licensee and accepted by the factory for the specific order 
in dispute). The arbitrator’s decision is binding and may not be appealed. Failure by either 
party to implement the arbitrator’s order in a timely fashion is, in the case of the licensee, 
considered a serious code violation. In the case of the factory, non-compliance results in 
revocation of DSP status.  
 
· The arbitrator issues a pubic report on the arbitration, providing a general summary of the 
dispute and his or her decision; the report is provided to universities by the WRC. This 
report does not include any specific pricing information or other proprietary data.  
 
· If the WRC identifies evidence that the fair price standard is being violated, but no 
arbitration has been triggered (which may occur in some instances because of fear on the 
part of the factory that demanding arbitration could harm its business relationship with the 
licensee), the WRC has the authority to convene a mandatory meeting, involving the 
licensee, the factory and the WRC, to discuss the potential violation. The contents of the 
meeting are confidential, but the parties are obligated to provide such information to the 
WRC as is necessary to inform the discussion. If the meeting does not result in the 
triggering of arbitration, or in a voluntary agreement to modify the price (the WRC will not 
have the power to impose any change in price), the WRC will institute a regime of stepped-
up inspections of the factory’s labor practices. The inspections will take place on a 
schedule to be determined by the WRC, and will focus on those areas of code compliance 
most likely to be affected by a violation of the fair price standard. This inspection regime 
will continue for one year. If labor rights violations are found at the factory, and if the 
WRC concludes that inadequate prices were a significant factor in causing these violations, 
this will be considered a code violation on the part of the licensee and will be reported to 
universities.  
 
· The WRC will report periodically to universities on whether the arbitration mechanism is 
functioning adequately as a means of ensuring fair prices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
